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The Epistemology of Testimony, edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa. Clarendon 
Press: Oxford. Pp. 312. 
 
ÒIn recent yearsÓ, Lackey begins, Òthe epistemic significance of testimony has been more 
fully appreciated. É The Epistemology of Testimony is intended to build on and further 
develop this work.Ó (P.1) This it does. The volume contains twelve papers which have 
been commissioned bar one. Many of these papers will undoubtedly prove key references 
in future research on testimony.  
In my opinion, this is particularly true of Richard MoranÕs ÒGetting Told and 
Being BelievedÓ. Moran focuses on a speaker telling an audience something and asks 
what reason this provides the audience for believing what is told. Since it is assumed that 
it is these reasons that justify the audienceÕs testimonial belief, this feeds into the central 
task of any epistemological theory of testimony which is explaining how such beliefs get 
to be justified. Now in the case of perception one could claim that perceptual belief is 
justified through standing in a certain relation to perceptual appearances, or that it is 
justified on the basis of beliefs about testimonial appearances. And there are parallel 
options in the epistemology of testimony. Similarly, one could make the positive claim 
that testimonial beliefs are associated with a unique type of justification Ð namely that 
given by forming belief on the basis of testimonial appearances. Or one could deny this 
positive claim: testimonial justification is not to be accounted for by a beliefÕs relation to 
testimonial appearances but by further beliefs one has about testimonial appearances or 
by facts about how the belief is reached; in familiar terms, one could propose an 
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antireductionist or a reductionist theory of testimony. MoranÕs bold and brilliantly 
substantiated claim is that existing theories of testimony almost universally fail to 
correctly represent the testimonial relationship and through doing so mischaracterise the 
justification we have for our testimonial beliefs. In framing the dispute as one over 
whether it is apriori that testimonial appearances provide evidence Ñ over whether 
testimonial appearances themselves provide evidence Ñ there is agreement that our 
testimonial beliefs are justified by what evidence testimonial appearances provide. 
However, this agreement makes it a mystery why we should ever prefer a speakerÕs word 
over other revelations of the speakerÕs beliefs that are not so open to manipulation. The 
central task for an epistemological theory of testimony, he then claims, is to explain how 
the intentional character of telling can add to an audienceÕs reason for belief. This 
challenge Moran answers by conceiving of telling as assurance: ÒOn a genuinely non-
Humean [i.e. non-evidential] account, when someone tells me itÕs cold out I donÕt simply 
gain an awareness of his beliefs, I am also given his assurance that itÕs cold out. This is 
something I could not have gained by the private observation of his behaviour. When 
someone gives me his assurance that itÕs cold out he explicitly assumes a certain 
responsibility for what I believe.Ó (P.278) Now there is the pressing question of why an 
audience should accept a speakerÕs assurance, given that it too is open to manipulation. 
And it should be clear that Moran does not specify an alternative to either 
antireductionism or reductionism but a specific positive account of how our testimonial 
beliefs are associated with a unique type of justification. But this does not detract from 
the fact that his paper offers an engaging new perspective in the testimony debate and 
trenchant criticism of existing theory. 
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It is attempts to see around existing theory, to find some disputable but common 
assumption or some alternative to either an antireductive or reductive theory of 
testimony, that is a theme of most of the articles in this collection. In their own ways the 
papers by Robert Audi, Peter Graham, Sanford Goldberg, Keith Lehrer, Jennifer Lackey 
and Elizabeth Fricker have this concern. Audi makes a novel and motivated proposal. He 
offers an antireductive account of testimonial knowledge: a speakerÕs knowing what he 
says is sufficient to put an audience in a position to acquire this knowledge; testimonial 
appearances can themselves be knowledge supporting. But then combines this with a 
reductive theory of testimonial justification: a speakerÕs being justified in believing what 
he says is not sufficient for an audience being justified in believing what the speaker 
says; for this the audience must further believe that the speaker is not misguided etc. This 
division is motivated in that it explains various intuitions; for instance, how children get 
to know things on the basis of testimony. However, it comes at a cost: a fundamental 
distinction is thereby drawn between knowledge and justified belief. Meanwhile 
Goldberg argues that one can deny the positive antireductive claim and yet still maintain 
that testimonial justification is a unique kind, even though this is ordinarily taken to be 
just the claim that testimonial beliefs are justified simply by their relation to testimonial 
appearances (i.e. the positive antireductive claim). Testimonial justification is unique, 
Goldberg argues, because when a belief is formed on the basis of testimonial appearances 
it Ògives rise to the hearerÕs right to pass the epistemic buck after her own justificatory 
resources have been abandoned.Ó (P.134) When an audience Ôpasses the epistemic buckÕ 
she holds a speaker responsible for the justification of her testimonial belief. This is 
consistent with denying the positive antireductive claim because it is a Òlast resortÓ and 
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available Òonly given that recipient of the testimony has already justified her reliance on 
that testimony.Ó (P.136) This seems to imply, as one would expect, that testimonial 
justification is unique because the positive antireductive claim holds; except now it only 
holds in a situation of Ôlast resortÕ. However, how could an audienceÕs running out of 
steam when it comes to defending her testimonial belief change the nature of that beliefÕs 
justification? If her belief can ultimately be justified simply on the basis of testimonial 
appearances, why cannot it be so justified throughout? Lehrer advances the reductive 
position that testimonial justification is given by beliefs about testimonial appearances or, 
in his terms, beliefs about the trustworthiness of speakers. However, a complete theory of 
testimonial justification, he notes, must then explain the justification we have for these 
beliefs. Appeals to observation cannot suffice across the board. So Lehrer proposes the 
general principle: ÒT: I am trustworthy in what I accept.Ó (P.155) Principle T equally 
cannot be grounded on personal observation, so this reductive project fails. However, if T 
is true, I will be trustworthy in my beliefs about trustworthiness; and trustworthy in my 
acceptance of T. Thus, T is basic for Lehrer: it represents a confident start from which 
one can work to non-sceptical conclusions. The resulting theory of testimony however is 
straightforwardly reductive all the while the truth of T can be understood in reliabilist 
terms. Rather than reconcile antireductive and reductive theories Graham purports to 
offer a Ôthird wayÕ between these theories through introducing the idea of Ôpro tanto 
justificationÕ. He says: ÒÔPro tantoÕ, as I understand it, means Ôas far as it goesÕ or Ôto that 
extentÕ. I contrast it with Ôon balanceÕ. A pro tanto justification is a consideration in favor 
of a certain belief.Ó (P.104) A testimonial belief is then justified by its relation to a 
testimonial appearance but this relation is not sufficient for this belief being justified Ôon 
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balanceÕ. For a testimonial belief to be justified the audience must further justify it on the 
basis of beliefs about the testimonial appearance. To my mind this is just to deny the 
positive claim made by antireductive theory: standing in a certain relation to testimonial 
appearances does not itself justify belief. No doubt this is to miss the distinction Graham 
draws between Ôpro tantoÕ and Ôon balanceÕ justification, but then I do not understand 
how something can be an (undefeated) justifier and yet not justify belief. Lackey 
similarly denies the positive antireductive claim: a testimonial belief cannot be justified 
by its relation to testimonial appearances alone, an audience must also justify this belief 
with further beliefs about the testimonial appearances. However, Lackey claims, this is 
not to endorse a reductive theory because beliefs about testimonial appearances are not 
sufficient to justify testimonial belief since there is a reliability constraint on justification. 
This necessitates that the testimonial appearance is a reliable indicator of its truth. Whilst 
I think that this is true, at least for the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, and that the 
point is well made by Lackey, again at least in regard to the acquisition of testimonial 
knowledge, this is not to propose an alternative to reductionism. What justifies an 
audienceÕs testimonial belief will be beliefs about testimonial appearances in conjunction 
with facts about how the testimonial belief is connected via appearances with its truth, 
but it will not be simply the beliefÕs standing in a certain relation to these testimonial 
appearances. By contrast, FrickerÕs theory appears to be anti-reductive in two respects. 
First, she speaks of Ôknowledge from trust in testimonyÕ; second, she proposes that an 
audience knows on the basis of Ôtrust in testimonyÕ only if there is someone who knows 
in non-testimonial way, or if there is non-testimonial knowledge supporting evidence, as 
in the case of scientific knowledge. The first of these respects is misleading however 
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since ÔtrustÕ is not sufficient for Ôproper acceptanceÕ unless it is coupled with a belief in 
sincerity and competence, (her principle TDAP2, p.232). In this case, I am unclear what 
ÔtrustÕ adds to acceptance; it is certainly not to be equated with MoranÕs Ôbelieving a 
speakerÕ which is arguably how ÔtrustÕ is ordinarily understood and which would suffice 
for proper acceptance Ñ at least if Moran is correct. Nevertheless, the resulting 
combination Fricker proposes of requiring reasons for justified acceptance and yet 
making the justification of testimonial belief depend on the wider system seems correct. 
(Indeed I have argued for exactly this combination in ÒThe Social Character of 
Testimonial KnowledgeÓ, Journal of Philosophy 97, 581-601.) 
The remaining papers include a careful exegesis of Reid by James Van Cleve, a 
nice comparison of testimony and memory by Frederick Schmitt, a discussion of 
foundationalist principles by Richard Fumerton and papers from two luminaries of 
epistemology and testimony, respectively Ernest Sosa and C.A.J.Coady. In ÒPathologies 
of TestimonyÓ Coady analyses the nature and epistemic status of gossip, rumour and 
urban myth and, in line with his general defence of testimony, concludes that none need 
be epistemically worthless. SosaÕs paper, meanwhile, is titled ÒKnowledge: Instrumental 
and TestimonialÓ and is a discussion of instrumental knowledge Ð i.e. the knowledge we 
gain from instruments. In relying on ÒGPS devices, cellular telephonesÓ etc. (p.117) we 
presume their reliability. This presumption of reliability can be justified on the basis of 
testimony or inductive generalisation. However, we cannot thereby reduce instrumental 
knowledge to testimonial knowledge, Sosa claims, because understanding or 
interpretative knowledge Òis a kind of instrumental knowledgeÓ (p.121). Nor can we 
reduce it to inductive knowledge since Òthe instruments on which we depend most 
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extensively and fundamentally are the perceptual modulesÓ (p.122). Now one thing 
unusual about this is that the comparison of testimonial knowledge with instrumental 
knowledge is normally the sign of a reductive theory: speakers can be, and shown by 
experience to be, reliable instruments. However, Sosa concludes that Ò[h]uman testimony 
stands with the senses in providing default rational justificationÓ (p.123). Now I presume 
that Moran would accept this conclusion, understood in a particular way, but reject any 
comparison of testimonial with instrumental knowledge. In this respect, The 
Epistemology of Testimony contributes to work on testimony through both developing its 
debate and showing that this debate remains open. 
